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Readers of The Thinker will need little reminding as to just how serious is the problem of climate 
change for the future of Africa. The 
latest analysis suggests that if global 
warming only reaches the 2°C level 
conventionally considered reasonably 
‘safe’ then African food production 
will drop by at least 10%. There 
has been a considerable degree of 
research on this topic with probably 
the most detailed coming from the 
International Food Policy Research 
Institute which has published three 
monographs on the impact of climate 
change on agriculture in east, west and 
southern Africa as well as some country 
specific research.1 Such detailed work 
inevitably produces conclusions which 
are too complex to easily summarise. 
As the Institute’s presentation at the 
Warsaw conference on climate change 
in November 2013, suggested there is 
‘the good, the bad and the ugly’ as in 
some places, particularly those with a 
great deal of irrigated agriculture, some 
impacts may actually be beneficial. In 
places with the ‘bad and ugly’ impacts 
(and these are the majority) african 
agriculture could adapt by adopting 
different crop varieties, increasing 
irrigation, even changing the whole 
crop balance of a region. However it 
will cost a great deal. A report, also 
presented in Warsaw, by the United 
Nations Environment Programme 
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(UNEP) suggested that at least US$350 
billion would be needed by 2070 if 
climate change moved much above 
the accepted target level 2°C. Even if 
this target was met costs of US$200 
billion could be incurred.2
This is just the impact on agriculture 
based upon transition to a new 
stable climate regime. In the interim 
period, huge costs will arise from the 
extreme weather events – droughts, 
floods, storms and so on – which are 
an increasing feature of the African 
weather. A number of coastal cities 
will also partially disappear under the 
rising sea.
Greater warming would prove 
even more catastrophic. Yet readers 
will also need little warning after 
the debacle of the Durban climate 
conference (The Thinker February, 
2012) that negotiations on a global 
carbon-reduction plan are moving at a 
glacial pace, if at all. In April, 2013 the 
European Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS) effectively collapsed. Introduced 
in 2005, the ETS was heralded as 
providing a market-based system for 
reducing carbon emissions rather than 
any top-down regulatory system. Under 
it, industries were required to purchase 
carbon credits to compensate for 
excess carbon emissions thus providing 
an incentive to greater efficiency. 
Unfortunately under business pressure, 
shed-loads of free permits were issued 
which, in times of economic recession, 
has led to the collapse of the price for 
permits to under £3/tonne when it is 
believed that a price closer to £30 is 
required to force genuine reductions. 
When the European Parliament 
rejected a plan to shore up the price, 
Milton Catelin, chief executive of the 
World Coal Association, called the 
European parliament vote "a triumph 
of common sense and balanced policy". 
Enough said.
In November, 2013, nearly 200 
countries met in Warsaw on the annual 
jamboree known as the Conference of 
the Parties to the UN Climate Change 
Convention, this year COP 19, and, 
as has become wearily familiar, they 
essentially agreed that they would 
meet again next year, this time in 
Peru, though important negotiations 
have been deferred until the end of 
2015 in Paris. In the first quarter of the 
Unless worldwide carbon emissions are 
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year, nations will be expected to put 
forward their planned “contributions” 
to cutting global emissions. These 
will be the centrepiece of a proposed 
global agreement agreed in Paris. The 
obviously-underwhelmed executive 
director of UNEP was quoted as saying 
“If delegates leave here (Warsaw) with 
a sense of how much is left to do, then 
maybe that will focus efforts in the 
coming 12 months because without 
that sense we all have reason to be very 
concerned”. 
The main topic of the negotiations 
in Warsaw appears to have been a 
very deep-seated conflict between 
two groupings: those countries who 
wish that the distinction between 
developed, industrial countries and 
the developing world, which was 
embedded in the Kyoto protocols in 
1997, be abolished now that China, 
in particular, has become the biggest 
global emitter; and those who wish to 
see the distinction maintained, arguing 
that, although there may be some 
degree of parity now in emissions, 
historically the developed industrial 
countries have contributed by far the 
greatest share of carbon dioxide still in 
the atmosphere. There are no prizes 
for guessing which countries belong to 
which camp. Whether this conflict will 
be patched up in Peru is very much an 
open question.
Just how limited have been the 
measures taken to reduce carbon 
emissions in the 20 years since climate 
change became officially recognised as 
a problem requiring global international 
action is shown by recent work by 
scientists at Lancaster University in 
England showing growth in long-term 
energy use.3 
They estimate that growth in CO2 
emissions has been fairly constant 
at about 2% p.a. ever since the mid-
nineteenth century and shows no signs 
of slowing down in the past decade. 
It is revealing that whilst the Great 
Depression of the 1930s did produce 
a distinct slowing in the rate of growth, 
the post-2008 recession has shown 
no comparable effect with emissions 
going remorselessly upwards. It is not 
entirely bad news as emissions in 2012 
have been reported as significantly 
below previous years.4 This report 
suggests that “The small increase in 
emissions of 1.1% in 2012 (including 
a downward correction of 0.3% for 
it being a leap year), may be the first 
sign of a more permanent slowdown in 
the increase in global CO2 emissions, 
and ultimately of declining global 
emissions”. Even so, what is needed is 
cuts rather than a slowdown and this 
remains a very distant prospect.
An oblique look at the chances of 
emissions being reduced comes from 
a study co-authored by the Carbon 
Tracker think-tank and the Grantham 
Research Institute5 into the valuation 
of energy-resource companies. This 
shows that “Between 60-80% of coal, 
oil and gas reserves of publicly listed 
companies are ‘unburnable’ if the world 
is to have a chance of not exceeding 
global warming of 2°C”. Yet these 
‘unburnable’ reserves are included in 
the stock-market valuations of these 
companies and they spent $674 
billion in 2012 discovering yet more 
potentially stranded assets. Prof. Stern, 
one of the authors, claims that “Smart 
investors can see that investing in 
companies that rely solely or heavily on 
constantly replenishing reserves of fossil 
fuels is becoming a very risky decision. 
The report raises serious questions as 
to the ability of the financial system 
to act on industry-wide long term 
risk, since currently the only measure 
of risk is performance against industry 
benchmarks.” This is the optimistic 
conclusion. The pessimistic is that 
financial markets see little possibility of 
controls over carbon emissions and are 
valuing companies in this light.
Reductions in greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions whether by direct 
control or market-based mechanisms 
have always rested upon four legs: 
various technical solutions, energy 
conservation, renewable energy and 
nuclear power. Now that the wackier 
schemes have been dropped, technical 
solutions come down to carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and electric 
vehicles. The latter are making steady, 
if slow, penetration into vehicle use in 
richer countries, mainly one suspects 
as town runabouts in two-car families, 
but will not make much progress in 
the galloping car markets of China 
and India. In any case, their low-
carbon rating depends crucially upon Fig 1: Annual Global CO2 Emissions since 1850 Source: Jarvis et al
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equivalent electricity which simply 
throws into relief the central problem 
of all low-carbon energy strategies: 
how to generate electricity. 
CCS has always been the possible key 
technology allowing both unrestricted 
use of fossil-fuels in power-generation 
and reductions in GHG. However 
progress on CCS remains slow. There 
are essentially three approaches: post-
combustion in which CO2 is removed 
from exhaust gases by dissolving it in a 
solvent; pre-combustion in which the 
fossil fuel is converted into a syngas 
composed of hydrogen and carbon 
monoxide which is then burnt; and 
oxyfuel-combustion in which fuel is 
burnt in pure oxygen, in both cases 
giving exhaust streams of water and 
CO2 which are easily separated. All 
give rise to a final stream of CO2 which 
has to be stored underground either in 
depleted hydrocarbon fields or deep 
aquifers. 
The advantage of the last two 
approaches is that they produce purer 
streams of CO2 which require, in 
principle, much less energy to separate. 
Post-combustion technology is quite 
well-understood but is hugely energy 
intensive requiring around 25% of a 
plant’s energy. It can be retrofitted to old 
stations but would reduce the output of 
older coal-stations running at around 
35% efficiency to derisory levels. 
There is a big pilot scheme being 
built at a Canadian power station at a 
cost of $1.24 billion which will recover 
a million tonnes of CO2 annually 
from an old 139 MW unit. It has the 
advantage that some of the cost will 
be recovered from using the recovered 
gas to produce more oil from nearby 
depleted fields but even so the cost is 
eye-watering. At the moment, it is the 
use of the derived gas in enhanced oil 
and gas recovery which drives project 
development mainly in the USA.
In the end, cost is the problem 
for CCS particularly in places which 
have no nearby underground storage 
opportunities. If translated into market 
terms, it would require a carbon price 
well above $50/CO2 to be viable, 
nearly twenty times above current 
European levels.
Energy conservation remains hugely 
important in GHG reduction and it 
is without doubt the area of quiet 
improvement which has done most 
to limit GHG emissions in the past 
few decades. The gradual elimination 
of incandescent light-bulbs, tighter 
building standards, the much greater 
fuel-efficiency of cars, improvements 
in efficiency of appliances, these and 
many other improvements have done 
much. However, as Fig 1 shows, by 
itself, energy conservation has done 
little to halt the inexorable rise of CHG 
emissions. The central problem remains 
the insatiable desire for electricity in 
most countries of the world. In Africa, 
electricity demand in 2012 grew by 
5.3% over 2011, the largest continental 
increase. It would have been greater 
had not demand in South Africa, the 
continent’s largest consumer actually 
dropped slightly. However, South 
African power generation, largely coal-
fired, has increased from 141 TWh 
in 1985 to 263 TWh in 2011.6 Other 
African countries show even higher 
growth rates whilst in the obvious 
example, China, generation has grown 
more than tenfold in the same period 
and shows no sign of slowing with an 
annual growth of 11.7% in 2011. The 
International Energy Agency forecasts 
that global electricity demand will grow 
by 70% by 2035.7
Given the central role that 
electrification plays in development 
there is no reason to doubt that such 
growth will continue well into the 
future. The issue is how to grow without 
generating carbon, particularly if a 
growth in the use of electric vehicles 
stimulates even greater growth. In 
principle, there is little problem in doing 
this. In the 1970s and ’80s, France 
removed about 80% of carbon emissions 
from its power system with the result 
that French emissions peaked in 1973 
at 544 million tonnes and in 2011 were 
down to 375 million. The practical issue 
is the means whereby France achieved 
this goal: nuclear power; and the wide-
spread and visceral opposition to this 
power source.
At the other end of the spectrum 
of popular acceptability, at least in 
principle, are various kinds of renewable 
energy including wind, photovoltaics, 
passive solar and, though often less 
acceptable in practice, hydropower. 
This last – although the only renewable 
power source which has made a 
significant impact of global generation 
16% of the total in 2011 compared 
to less than 2% from wind – is subject 
to constant environmental criticism to 
the extent that large dam construction 
has slowed to a snail’s-pace in many 
countries. Issues of land acquisition 
and population displacement, together 
with ecological and archaeological 
damage have dogged many schemes. 
A taste of the kind of opposition can be 
seen in the critique of Southern African 
schemes by Mary Galvin, a South 
African activist:
Dam-affected communities in 
Southern Africa are calling for 
access to water, sometimes from 
the very dams that displaced them, 
for recognition of their situation, 
and for reparations. While there 
has been engagement in the [World 
Commission on Dams] WCD process 
and signs of government action, 
communities are generally frustrated 
by the failure to move past merely 
talking and actually respond to these 
calls. Yet this is far from surprising 
– the LHWP [Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project] is proceeding with 
more modern versions of the same 
damage wrought by colonial and 
apartheid governments. Problem-
ridden programmes for dam-affected 
communities, as well as a disregard 
for wider distribution and equity 
issues, require civil society vigilance 
and action... The key question is 
whether activists in Southern Africa 
can learn from social movements 
that have arisen around dam 
struggles in other parts of the world, 
and organise communities that are 
geographically and culturally isolated 
from one another to respond to 
these life-impacting issues.8
The author has no intention of 
taking sides in this contentious issue 
except to note that it would be easy to 
find similar expressions of opposition 
in countries as far apart as Mexico and 
India, whilst in the U.K., environmental 
opposition to the one potential large-
scale hydro project in the country, 
the Severn Barrage, has stalled its 
development for decades.
In Africa, the potential for hydro-
power is very large but, as elsewhere, 
it remains contentious. For example, 
the so-called Renaissance dam on the 
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Nile in Ethiopia which will generate 
some 6,000 MW when completed 
in 2017 has raised serious concerns 
in Egypt about its impact upon water 
supply to that country. An even larger 
project is the Grand Inga (Fig. 2) which 
if fully completed would be the world's 
largest hydroelectric plant with more 
than twice the power generation of 
the Three Gorges Dam in China, in 
principle up to 40,000 MW from six 
separate generating stations. Situated 
about 50 km from the mouth of the 
Congo river in south-west DR Congo, 
it is a huge undertaking only made 
feasible by the participation of South 
Africa which has agreed to take 
around 2,500 MW of the 4,800 MW 
produced in the initial phase due to be 
completed in 2020. However, around 
30,000 people will be displaced by 
the dam’s lake, probably more in later 
phases, and there have been reports of 
unease about just how expensive the 
project will prove and how little local 
people will benefit. The cost of this first 
phase is put at US$11 billion.
The problem is that hydro-power 
is the one renewable source that 
is capable of providing steady and 
predictable base-load generation. 
Whilst wind, sun and waves are able 
to provide significant amounts of 
fluctuating generation, they all require 
backup fossil capacity and cannot 
readily touch base-load operation. 
Spain and Germany, for example, 
probably the most successful countries 
in the world in developing renewable 
energy thanks to their abundant wind 
and solar, are able to generate around 
10% of their total demand from these 
sources. There are European targets to 
meet 20% of total energy consumption 
from renewable sources by 2020 which 
includes a substantial contribution 
from biofuels in the transport sector, a 
now rather discredited source because 
of its impact on food production. In the 
poorer countries of the world, China 
has made huge efforts to increase its 
renewable generation particularly in 
the last five years and generated 78.3 
TWh in 2011 or 9.1% of the world 
total. But this achievement rather pales 
beside the 4700 TWh generated by the 
entire system. South Africa, the largest 
African emitter, manages to do badly in 
any of these comparisons, consuming 
just 0.4 million tonnes of oil equivalent 
(mtoe) in all renewables in 2011 
compared with 92.9 mtoe of coal and 
even 2.9 mtoe of nuclear.
Most energy analysts looking 
objectively at the issue would 
now recognise that to effectively 
decarbonise electricity generation 
worldwide by, say, 80% of its current 
levels will require a large contribution 
from nuclear power which currently 
provides about 12% of world supply. 
Yet, on current policies not only is 
nuclear power not going to increase in 
the future but it is likely to diminish. 
In 2011, following the Fukushima 
incident, the German government 
announced that the eight oldest nuclear 
plants, closed immediately after the 
incident, would never re-open whilst 
the remaining nine stations would be 
closed by 2022. No new plant would 
be built. The likely impact on German 
carbon emissions of this decision has 
been hotly debated since, but the 
best technical judgement is the most 
obvious: that much of the closed 
capacity will be filled by new coal-fired 
stations however much renewables are 
pushed by increasing the already large 
subsidies. Backing this analysis is the 
fact that in 2013, Germany will open 
5,300 MW of coal-fired plant, the 
largest such increase for twenty years.
 It is difficult to believe that this 
action by the German government, 
mirrored by comparable movement in 
Japan and by a general shift in many 
countries towards at least delaying 
nuclear development, is based upon 
any rational assessment of the risks of 
continuing to operate plants which 
have operated safely for some decades. 
What one has to look at is the ingrained 
hostility to nuclear power which exists 
in a sizeable and influential part of 
environmental movements in these 
and other, largely European, countries. 
The origins of this hostility lie in the 
confused and fractured politics of the 
Fig 2: Inga dam project
Source: bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24856000
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1970s given that up to this time nuclear 
power had been generally welcomed 
and seen as an appropriate power 
source for a new industrial era.
One important source was the 
linkage which existed between nuclear 
power and nuclear weapons in all the 
major countries (USa, UK, France and 
Russia) which then had lead place in 
developing both technologies. This 
linkage is exemplified by the British 
claim that the Calder Hall reactor, 
opened with much fanfare by the 
Queen in 1956, was the first civil 
nuclear power station. In fact, the 
primary purpose of the station was 
to produce plutonium for weapons 
just as the primary purpose of the 
original uranium enrichment plants 
was to produce weapons-grade 
U235. This linkage has never been 
entirely broken. Only Israel of the 
world’s nuclear powers has developed 
nuclear weapons without also having 
uranium enrichment facilities. There 
is strong evidence, however, that 
Israel collaborated with apartheid 
South Africa in the production of 
nuclear weapons and South Africa did 
possess enrichment facilities probably 
associated with nuclear weapon 
development. The current impasse 
over Iran’s nuclear ambitions centres 
around the dual role of enrichment in 
civil and in military use.
There is no doubt that in the 1970s, 
this link coupled with the strong anti-
nuclear (weapons) protests of the times 
in Europe and, to a degree, in the 
USA, meant that civil nuclear power 
lost its aura as the clean fuel of the 
future and became instead a symbol 
of military-industrial capitalism at its 
worst. The central fear became one of 
the possible devastation of a nuclear 
disaster, devastation closely connected 
in people’s minds with the known 
effect of nuclear weapons. This fear 
was deepened by the partial reactor-
meltdown at the Three Mile Island 
plant in 1979 and finally made only too 
real by the catastrophe at Chernobyl in 
1986 which effectively put a stop to any 
further nuclear development in Europe. 
Fig. 3 is a photograph of a model of 
the Chernobyl reactor after its lid blew 
off. The Fukushima incident in March, 
2011, the only other event ever given a 
Level 7 or Major Incident rating by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, 
was in some ways an echo of Chernobyl.
Let’s rewind a little. There have 
been four reported nuclear incidents 
with the capacity to cause widespread 
harm. (It is possible that there were 
also unreported accidents in Soviet 
waste-disposal sites). The first was at 
the British Windscale establishment 
in 1957. Windscale was then a purely 
military establishment and there was a 
limited release of radiation following a 
reactor fire caused by an unexpected 
surge of energy in the graphite 
reactor-core. The Three Mile Island 
incident, potentially very serious but in 
the event fairly harmless, was caused 
by an unexpected chemical reaction, 
in this case between high-temperature 
water and the uranium fuel-rods which 
caused a hydrogen cap to form above 
the reactors following a stuck valve in 
the cooling system. Chernobyl, the only 
incident which caused immediate loss 
of life, was caused by an unauthorised 
experiment by the reactor operators, 
most of whom died, on the graphite-
moderated RMBK reactors. The 
subsequent fire caused a very large 
radiation release over a wide-area and 
the evacuation of thousands of people 
from land much of which remains 
off-limits. At Fukushima, the critical 
problem following an earthquake 
and subsequent tsunami was that the 
backup generators necessary to supply 
power for cooling water circulation 
after grid failure were located, 
inexplicably for a seaside plant, in 
low-lying rooms and were flooded in 
the tsunami. As a consequence, three 
of reactors were exposed, caught fire 
and caused hydrogen explosions which 
released large amounts of radiation. 
No people were directly killed by this 
(though several plant workers were 
killed in the initial tsunami) but there 
are likely to be increased cancers in 
some of the exposed population. In 
total, 31 immediate deaths in 56 years 
plus an unknown number of associated 
cancers, certainly hundreds in the case 
of Chernobyl though probably much 
lower in the other three incidents. (In 
passing, it should be noted that most of 
those who died at Chernobyl were the 
very courageous fire-fighters).
Is it relevant to compare this record 
with, say, just major incidents in South 
African coal mines alone? 417 deaths 
in 1960 at Coalbrook North colliery; 64 
deaths in 1983 at Hlobane Colliery; 53 
deaths in 1993 at Middelbult colliery, a 
total of 534 in 53 years. In 2012, there 
were 18 deaths, a kind of continuing 
background noise. Or is a comparison 
with the most important renewable 
resource, hydropower relevant? In 
1975, the Banqiao Reservoir Dam in 
China collapsed killing some 26,000 
people directly after Typhoon Nina 
dropped huge amounts of rain on the 
region. In this and associated dam 
failures, an estimated 171,000 people 
died, 11 million people lost their 
homes and there was the sudden loss 
of 18 GW of power capacity. Dam 
collapses are not unusual nor are 
Fig. 3: Model of Chernobyl reactor after accident
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deaths associated with these though 
not usually on the scale of Banqiao. 
They are even on YouTube.9 
Well, probably not. In public 
perception, coal-mining is a 
‘dangerous job’ where death is seen 
as part of normal business whilst 
dam collapse is one of those things 
which ‘just happen’ usually because 
of abnormal weather. Yet memories, 
even inherited, of looking down into 
the fires of hell at Chernobyl just 
will not go away or be put into the 
category of stuff which happens. 
There is, after all, the correction 
perception that one of the impacts of 
nuclear release could be some level of 
accelerated cancer cases, maybe small, 
maybe not, plus the issue of long-term 
land sterilisation. Yet throw into this 
mix, the certainty, not possibility, that, 
unless worldwide carbon emissions 
are reduced, within twenty years, 
hundreds then thousands of people in 
Africa alone will die unpleasant deaths 
whilst a lot of land will become barren 
then the balance of perception really 
ought to change. Will it? As things 
stand probably not unless there is some 
strong political leadership. And at the 
moment, governments in countries 
such as Germany and Japan are 
running scared of existing hostility 
to nuclear power and are, at the 
same time, refusing to face up to the 
urgency of reaching some international 
agreement on a programme of GHG 
reductions. At the moment, South 
Africa is the only African country in 
which nuclear power is a realistic 
option to fossil-generation but it is all 
African countries that will suffer unless 
other nations act.
The fact is that even if there were 
to be immediately a big push for new 
nuclear plant, it would hardly begin to 
have an impact before 2020 and even 
later if the retirement of old nuclear 
plant, much of which approaches 40 
years-old, is taken into account. Nor 
is there now any real chance of a new 
international treaty to limit CHG being 
implemented before 2020 given that 
the most optimistic assessment is that it 
could be agreed in 2015. 
The International Energy Agency, 
recognising both the inevitability of 
these time-lags and also the fact that 
“Climate change has quite frankly slipped 
to the back burner of policy priorities”10 
as well as the urgency of some action 
to reduce CHG, has published a four-
point plan the  for actions which could 
be undertaken without too much 
investment. It calls this a 4-for-2°C 
Scenario, in which four energy policies 
are selected that can deliver significant 
emissions reductions by 2020, relying 
only on existing technologies and have 
already been adopted successfully 
in several countries. In this 4-for-2°C 
Scenario, global energy-related 
greenhouse-gas emissions are 8% (3.1 
Gt CO2 equivalent) lower in 2020 than 
the level otherwise expected on existing 
policies.11
They include:
• Targeted energy efficiency 
measures in buildings, industry and 
transport account for nearly half the 
emissions reduction in 2020, with 
the additional investment required 
being more than offset by reduced 
spending on fuel bills.
• Limiting the construction and use of 
the least-efficient coal-fired power 
plants which deliver more than 20% 
of the emissions reduction and helps 
curb local air pollution. The share of 
power generation from renewables 
increases (from around 20% today 
to 27% in 2020), as does that from 
natural gas.
• actions to halve expected methane 
(a potent greenhouse gas) releases 
into the atmosphere from the 
upstream oil and gas industry in 
2020 provide 18% of the savings.
• Implementing a partial phase-out 
of fossil fuel consumption subsidies 
accounts for 12% of the reduction 
in emissions and supports efficiency 
efforts.
Perhaps the most important of these 
in some parts of Africa, particularly the 
south and especially in South Africa, 
much the largest emitter of CHG on 
the continent, is the future use of 
natural gas along with more use of 
the renewables in which to date its 
progress has been less than convincing. 
It already imports a little gas from 
Mozambique and there have been 
major new discoveries there. In 2012, 
Michael Bagraim, president of the 
Cape Chamber of Commerce said “The 
significance for South Africa is that these 
discoveries should wipe the nuclear 
option off the table. We now have 
enough gas on our borders to generate 
all the electricity we could ever use. 
It will be the easy way to reduce our 
carbon emissions”.12 In addition, South 
Africa is believed to have substantial 
shale gas reserves in the Karoo Basin, 
with technically accessible reserves well 
in excess of 1 trillion cubic metres.13 
With current consumption below 7 
billion cubic metres annually, there is 
clearly a lot of headroom for growth 
from both sources. There are both 
environmental and water-resource 
issues about shale-gas production but 
in 2012 the government cleared the 
way for it despite these concerns by 
lifting a moratorium on development.
However not many countries are 
sitting on top of a gas bonanza. In 
any case, although increased gas use, 
particularly if it replaces coal, may 
limit carbon emissions, it will not 
decarbonise power generation in the 
same way as nuclear can. 
It is a reluctant conclusion. The 
author helped organise the expert 
opposition to the major nuclear-power 
projects in the U.K. in the 1980s and 
still recognises the negative sides of 
the industry. But in the face of growing 
evidence for the direct and immediate 
harm of climate change, there is 
really little alternative to its global 
development and, in Africa, for South 
Africa to regard it as a serious option 
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